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Abstract 
The Lisbon Treaty paved the way for restructuring the institutional landscape in EU foreign and 
security policy. In order to improve coherence and coordination, the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs (HRVP) has obtained more powers and is now assisted by the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). The HRVP is the recipient of delegated authority from the member 
states (MS) to formulate, coordinate and implement the external policies of the European Union. 
Formal decision-making power pertaining to the EU’s common foreign and security policy lies with 
the Council, whilst substantial competences, notably in the field of the European Neighbourhood and 
Trade policies, as well as Development and Cooperation remain under the control of the European 
Commission (Commission). Concomitantly, as its supporting bureaucracy, the EEAS is situated within 
several, partly overlapping and conflicting accountability relationships. The questions, this paper 
seeks to answer, are: To what extent, how and by whom can the HRVP and/or the EEAS be held 
politically to account?  
In order to shed some light on this issue, the paper discusses the HRVP/EEAS’ relationships with 
three of its ‘significant others’, namely, the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. 
Against three standards of political accountability – popular control, checks-and-balances and 
efficiency – we examine whether and to what the degree the above institutions are in the position to 
hold respectively the HRVP and the EEAS to account for their actions. With data from official 
documents, 47 semi-structured interviews with EEAS and Commission officials and a survey among 
184 EU foreign policy-makers, the paper thus aims at providing a map and an assessment of the 
multi-level actor/forum relationships of the EU’s foreign policy machinery. 
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Introduction 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the EU foreign policy executive was comprehensively 
rearranged. The former rotating Council Presidency, the High Representative for Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and the European Commissioner for External Relations, are now all replaced and 
combined in the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (HR/VP) – a  position since 2014 held by Ms Federica Mogherini. According to the Articles 18 
and 27 of the TFEU, the HR/VP:  
 conducts the Union's common foreign and security policy; 
 contributes by her proposals to the development of that policy, which she carries 
out as mandated by the Council, and ensures implementation of the decisions 
adopted; 
 presides over the Foreign Affairs Council of Ministers; 
 is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission and thus ensures the consistency 
of the Union's external action. 
 represents the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security 
policy, conducts political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and 
expresses the Union's position in international fora. 
 exercises authority over the European External Action Service and over EU 
delegations in third countries and at international organisations.1 
In the wake of this institutional rearrangement, by Council Decision (427/2010) the EU created a 
dedicated administrative apparatus, the European External Action Service (EEAS) in order to assist 
the HR in achieving “[…] consistency and coordination of the Union’s external action as well as by 
preparing policy proposals and implementing them after their approval by the Council.” The EEAS is a 
functional autonomous body placed “under the authority of the HR/VP”, and the latter is, next to her 
political function also the bureau head of the former, and consequently has to assume political 
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responsibility for this bureaucracy.2 Prior to Lisbon, the High Representative for the Union Foreign 
and Security Policy, a position established by the Treaty of Amsterdam and occupied from 1999-2009 
by Javier Solana, was only equipped with a relatively small office at the General Secretariat of the 
Council. The ‘old’ HR was exclusively dealing with the intergovernmental side of EU foreign policy, i.e. 
security and defence.  
The rationale behind this reorganisation in foreign policy was to improve ‘coherence’ of the EU 
foreign policy (Art. TEU), and to bring together different foreign policy instruments and structures 
under one organizational roof. The ‘new’ HR/VP has been described as ‘hybrid institutional figure’ 
(Missiroli 2010: 430) or ‘Janus-faced’ and ‘rather schizophrenic actor’ (Curtin 2009: 102) because the 
position is combining, first, the role of the High Representative of the CFSP with, second, the position 
of a Vice-President of the European Commission, responsible for External Relations and playing a 
coordinating role for other DGs of the External Relations (RELEX) family (DGs Development and 
Cooperation, DEVCO, Enlargement, ELARG, and Trade), with, third, the functions of the chair of the 
Foreign Affairs Council, formerly exercised by the Foreign Minister of the Member State holding the 
rotating EU Presidency (Art. 18 TEU).   
The EEAS, as the supporting bureaucracy of the HR/VP, is an organizational hybrid with inbuilt 
ambiguities stemming from the inherited pillar structure and divided competence areas between 
community institutions and the member states. In the Council (FAC), the HR/VP is regarded as one of 
their own (‘primus inter pares’) by the foreign ministers of the member states. However, in line with 
the “Declaration by the High Representative on Political Accountability”, (annexed to Council 
Decision 427/2010, establishing the EEAS) and unlike the situation prior to the establishment of the 
EEAS, the HR/VP is now formally obliged to answer to the European Parliament and to justify her 
policy choices to a directly elected body. As can be seen from Figure 1 (ANNEX I) displaying the 
institutional embedded-ness of the EEAS, multiple oversight relations can be discerned as an 
organizing principle in order to secure political influence and control from both the 
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intergovernmental and the community spheres, involving notably the Council, the Commission, and 
the EP in a struggle over power and institutional turf. This article sets out to disentangle these 
multiple and overlapping accountability relations, and overall the question is to what extent have the 
institutional innovations that both the HR and the EEAS represent made EU external action more (or 
less) accountable?  
While the focus of the nascent literature on the EEAS is on coordination and consistency of EU 
foreign policy (e.g. Balfour and Ojanen 2011, Biscop 2011, Dijkstra 2013, Sjursen 2012, Smith 2012, 
2013, Portela and Raube 2012, Thomas and Tonra 2012), where the EEAS has been described as a 
long missing bridge over the divisions of the old EU pillar structure. A public administration approach 
to the EEAS to understand the nature of the organization and its behaviour has been adopted by 
Bátora 2013, Formuszewicz and Liszczyk 2013, Henökl 2014a and b, Juncos and Pomorska 2013 or 
Ongaro 2012. Legal scholars have engaged in an interpretation of the framework set out by the 
Lisbon Treaty and EEAS Decision (Blockmans 2012, Blockmans and Hillion 2013, Van Vooren 2011) 
and have discussed its competences and role within EU’s institutional architecture, as well as its 
status with regard to international law (Blockmans and Spernbauer 2013, Cardwell 2012, Wessel and 
Van Vooren 2011, Wouters et al. 2013).  The establishment of the EEAS, it is suggested, may entail 
different ways of exercising control and the creation of new accountability relations, especially in a 
policy domain that frequently stayed outside the radar of Parliamentary control at national level and 
has been described as a ‘domaine réservé’ of the executive (Aron 1995: 28), or ‘’above’ normal 
politics’ with hindsight to parliamentary scrutiny (Tonra 2011: 1911). Accountability is particularly 
important in the field of external governance, where in many instances EU external action directly 
affects territories and populations outside of the EU, such as in military or civilian crisis management 
missions (e.g. sovereignty administration as in the case of EUNAVFOR off the costs of Somalia), or by 
indirectly but de facto administrating policies in third countries (e.g. the judicial sector in EULEX 
Kosovo). 
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The question of autonomy and democratic legitimacy of the EEAS and EU foreign policy making has 
pre-occupied a number of scholars (e.g. Bátora 2010, Henökl 2015, Raube 2012, Stie 2010, Tonra 
2011). While the literature on EEAS autonomy may be related, it does not satisfactorily deal with 
accountability issues. In addition, the existing research often focuses on how things ought to be, and 
findings are still inconclusive. What is missing, is a more systematic study of de jure and de facto 
accountability relations, mapping the different forums the EEAS has to answer to. This article 
contributes a cartography of the existing accountability relationships, based on a study of formal 
rules as well as empirical data on officials’, day-to-day embedment in accountability relations, and 
their individual accountability orientations and behaviour. In order to shed light on the specific 
question of accountability, the article investigates to what extent the policy-making/shaping and 
implementation by the HR/VP and the EEAS can be held to account, by whom and for what? 
Moreover, we ask whether and to what extent the creation of the EEAS improves (or obscures) the 
accountability of the European foreign policy, as compared to the pre-Lisbon situation.  
With data from official documents, 46 semi-structured interviews with EEAS and Commission officials 
and a survey among 184 EU foreign policy-makers, the article seeks to answer the above question. 
The article is structured in the following manner: In the second part, the analytical framework is 
presented, before presenting methodology and data in the third section. The fourth and fifth parts 
hold the analysis of de jure and de facto accountability relations and forums, respectively. Finally, we 
summarize our findings and present conclusion in the last section. 
 
Analytical Framework 
Accountability, in its generic form, is defined as a social “...relationship between an actor and a 
forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can 
pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens et al. 2010: 35). 
As we can see, it is a more comprehensive concept than a mere principal-agent relationship in that a 
6 
 
full accountability arrangement requires institutionalised practices of information-giving, debate and 
sanctions/ consequences between an agent (the accountable) and a forum (the body holding the 
agent to account).  
Figure 2: The generic model of accountability (Bovens et al., 2010: 41): 
Actor       Forum 
 
Informing    Debating  Judging 
about conduct         Informal 
       Consequences 
          Formal 
From this generic accountability model, we start by mapping the forums to which the HR/VP/EEAS 
are obliged (de jure and de facto) to give account for their conduct. The clout of the forum(s) will 
then be evaluated according to how well the three phases of information-giving, debate and 
consequences function as institutionalised practices of account-giving. To determine how well the 
different forums are at holding the HR/VP/EEAS to account depend on which perspective or 
normative standard one applies. Bovens et al. (ibid: 45-52) develop three perspectives with three 
distinct rationales, namely democratic, constitutional and learning perspectives, explaining why 
accountability is important: “First, accountability is important to provide a democratic means for 
citizens and their representatives to monitor and control government conduct. Second, it is 
important for preventing the development of dangerous concentrations of executive power. Third, it 
is a pivotal tool for making government deliver better public value.” The strength of the 
accountability arrangements in which the HR/VP/EEAS stand will consequently be discussed against 
these three perspectives.  
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At the first glance the following types of accountability (cf. Bovens et al., 2010, chapter 3), relevant 
for the EU’s foreign policy bureaucracy, can be discerned. We will discuss them in detail below, in the 
context of the different forums, to which they can be allocated: 
1) Political accountability: encompassing accountability arrangements vis-à-vis political 
institutional actors (such as the European Parliament and the Council), but also the EU 
member states. 
2) Administrative accountability: consisting of accountability arrangements with regard to 
administrative and financial aspects, vis-à-vis the competent bodies of the Union 
(Commission, Court of Auditors). 
3) (Quasi-)judicial or legal accountability: encompassing accountability arrangements vis-à-vis 
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (such as Court of Justice or national or international legal 
instances). 
 
Conceptualizing the multi-level actor/forum relationships in the EU system, Bovens et al. (2010) and, 
Brandsma (this issue) or Wille (this issue), respectively elaborate on the increasingly sophisticated 
European ‘accountability architecture’ and on an ‘accountability framework for multi-level 
governance’. Based on the Bovens (2007, 2010) analytical framework, and the conceptual 
introduction to this special issue by Brandsma, Heidbreder and Mastenbroek (2014), we, firstly, map 
the accountability relations in which the HR/VP and the EEAS stand and, secondly, discuss the extent 
to which the current institutional arrangement ensures more (or less) accountability than the pre-
Lisbon situation.   
Method and data 
For the empirical analysis, the article draws on three main sources of data; relevant official 
documents, semi-structured interviews with 46 EU officials working in or closely with the EEAS as 
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well as data from a survey among foreign policy decision makers. The methodology, used to analyse 
the survey data basically consists of looking at the relation between officials’ previous and present 
affiliation and their conception of personal and organisational accountability relations (by asking 
about commitment to organizational ethics and accountability rules, loyalty and allegiance, 
importance of political guidance by the relevant forums, professional concerns etc.). Dichotomising 
between the different staff categories (permanent vs. temporary staff), we analyse the survey data 
according to institutional provenance (supranational vs. intergovernmental recruits) to see whether 
there are differences, and, if so, what these differences are. In addition, the paper can also draw on 
information on changes in the work situation of officials, comparing the level of administrative 
discretion in terms of instructions and reporting lines, job responsibility and marge de manoeuvre to 
the situation before the establishment of the EEAS. (For a presentation of the dataset form the 2013 
EEAS survey, see ANNEX II EEAS survey data, below). 
Before analysing the de facto and day-to-day accountability conceptions of staff, we first map the 
existing de jure relationships, by forum and type of accountability. 
 
Mapping accountability forums and relationships 
In the most immediate sense, it is the HR/VP who has to account to her political principals, and the 
EEAS as a body is “[…] placed under the authority of the HR/VP”.3 It is however difficult to see how 
the HR/VP constitutes a forum to which the EEAS must render account. The relationship between the 
HR/VP and the EEAS does therefore not amount to an accountability relation proper. Rather, the 
EEAS should be seen as the HR/VP’s executive arm or body. For the EEAS then, a number of different 
accountability relations can be derived from the EEAS Decision, and four types of accountability (in 
the typology of Bovens et al. 2010) can be identified. The forums of accountability are Parliaments 
(EP and national) as directly elected representatives of citizens; and other EU level institutions 
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(Council, Commission and the Court of Auditors) for political, legal and administrative/financial 
issues. 
Figure 2: Accountability types and forums 
Accountability types Accountability forums 
Administrative Commission, EP  
Political Council, EP4; European Council; national 
parliaments 
Financial EEAS Internal Auditor, Internal Auditor of the  
Commission5, European Court of Auditors6, OLAF, 
EP 
(Quasi/indirectly-)legal Court of Justice 
Professional accountability Member states’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
(Typology according to Bovens et al. 2010) 
 
In the following, we focus on the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission as these 
relations are the politically most salient forums for the EEAS. Moreover, the role of the remaining 
two institutions, the ECA and the ECJ is either relatively clear, as in the case of the ECA, or somewhat 
limited, as in the case of the ECJ, they are treated in a less detailed manner. Finally, we neither 
discuss the formal relationships between the EEAS and the European Council nor with the MS 
diplomatic services, because the Council Decision makes only allusive mention of them. We do, 
however, include them in the empirical analysis, since politically they may be relevant for guiding and 
informing officials’ actions and accountability orientations. 
 
1. The European Parliament 
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The European Parliament could increase its influence during the negotiation process that lead to the 
EEAS Council Decision, to counter-balance the autonomy of the EEAS. Effectively, the EP managed to 
obtain greater political control over the service: with the amendment of budgetary procedures, the 
implementation of the EEAS operational budget remains subject to discharge by the EP. In addition 
to administrative accountability (over administrative budget and staff as foreseen by financial and 
staff regulations), by including a ‘Declaration on Political Accountability’ in the EEAS Decision the EP 
also ensured political accountability where the HR/VP (or senior EEAS bureaucrats and diplomats) 
have to answer to questions. In case the HR/VP cannot participate in a plenary debate of the 
Parliament, s/he would have to be replaced by a competent (DEVCO, ELARG, TRADE) Commissioner 
or by the Foreign Minister of the member state holding the rotating Presidency. Also, EU Heads of 
Delegations and EU Special Representatives have to undergo Parliamentary hearings before they are 
taking up new postings.   
Other than naming and blaming during public debates or via reports and parliamentary motions, the 
EP has at several occasions threatened direct sanctions to the EEAS, namely by withholding EEAS’ 
budget lines (ex ante) or not discharging the EEAS from budget responsibility (ex post), under the EPs 
co-responsibility (with the Council) for the Union budget. 
With regard to the European Parliament at least two types of accountability apply: 
Political accountability: According to the Council’s EEAS Decision (article 1, paragraph 6 the Council 
Decision 2010/427/EU) setting up the EEAS, “the European Parliament will fully play its role in the 
external action of the Union, including its functions of political control as provided for in Article 14(1) 
TEU, as well as in legislative and budgetary matters as laid down in the Treaties”. These provisions 
and the fact that the HR/VP has to answer to Parliamentary questions and witness in the plenary 
assembly give the Parliament ample room for playing a role as forum of political accountability. The 
HR/VP has to consult the EP on the main policy choices and take Parliament’s views into due 
consideration. In addition, the EP has full access rights to documents and information, including 
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sensitive information. Special measures have been taken to access, including security vetting of 
selected AFET committee (the EP’s foreign affairs committee) members. 
Financial/budgetary accountability: Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 
on the “Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (the 
‘Financial Regulation’)” was amended in order to include the EEAS in Article 1 thereof, with a specific 
section in the Union budget. In accordance with the applicable rules, and as is the case for other 
institutions, a part of the annual report of the Court of Auditors will also be dedicated to the EEAS, 
and the EEAS has to respond to such reports. The EEAS is subject to the budgetary discharge 
procedures as provided for in Article 319 TFEU and in Articles 145 to 147 of the Financial Regulation. 
By using its budgetary power as negotiation chip the Parliament managed to increase its influence on 
the service and the EU’s foreign policy. As one MEP said, “the EP can use the instrument of blocking 
certain administrative budget lines, e. g. for EEAS salaries, in order to get its will with regard to 
structural changes or to have its positions taken seriously” (Interview #37). 
A number of scholars have observed Parliament’s strengthened role in EU foreign policy matters 
(Furness 2013, Raube 2014, Wisniewski 2013). And, during the last 4 years, the Parliament could 
indeed carve out a role as one of the political overseers of the EEAS. 
 
2. The Council of the European Union 
The Council is the forum that mandates the HR/VP to make proposals and implement policies that 
fall within the competence area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. For these policies the 
Council is the place where HR/VP has to seek approval and legitimize its actions. In addition, the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC), composed of MS representatives at ambassadorial level is a 
high-level decision-making organ that sends political guidance to EEAS structures on central matters 
of CFSP (as do the Political Directors of the MS MFAs by ‘advising’ Deputy Executive Director on 
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foreign policy issues.) In practice, as accountability forum the Council operates in a non-
confrontational (consensual) manner, i.e. there are no formal sanctions against the HR/VP or the 
EEAS. However, ‘misbehaviour’ on the part of the EEAS or HR/VP may trigger negative diplomatic or 
ambient consequences, such as MS protesting (e.g. letters written to the HR/VP) or refusing to 
cooperate on a next occasion. Referring to Bovens et al. (2010), such a reaction of expressing 
disagreement may be categorized as an informal way of sanctioning.  
The informal and political nature of the relationship with the Council is very well illustrated by the 
testimony of a senior EEAS official, responsible for the relations with the Political and Security 
Committee:  
“A lot of what we are trying to do is behind closed doors, and the reason that is not part of the public 
process, is that it is a way that enables the HR to take initiatives and push decisions. It is about trying 
to anticipate what these decisions are going to be and to put them to the MS, so that when [the 
HR/VP] does X, Y, or Z, that there is not a huge problem after she has done it. […] It is an erosion of 
trust. So, next time when you have an issue MS will be much more restrictive on the boundaries of 
what can be done. It is a give and take. It […] is about the judgments made.” (Interview #7). 
The Council is also the forum deciding about the outcome of the review process that began in 2013 
and is currently under way. Even though this process is not expected to produce any major reforms 
or a revision of Council Decision 427/2010, it clearly a more formalized process of debate, judgment 
and potentially sanctions. 
 
3. The European Commission 
In the case of the Commission, lines of delegation and accountability relations are complex and 
intertwined, not least because the Commission is itself a body vested with powers resulting from 
supra-national delegation by the EU MS. Competences are partly overlapping, instructions are issued 
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by several sources and reporting lines have in many instances been characterized as redundant. 
Administratively, the EEAS needs to work closely together with the Commission in all areas of 
external relations that fall into community competences as well as for the implementation of its 
operational budget. (see e.g. ‘Vademecum Note On Working Relations with the European 
Commission’ of 2011). But also at the political level, due to the fact that the HR is a Vice President of 
the Commission, decisions pertaining to external relations have to be discussed and agreed upon by 
the college of Commissioners.   
One specific point concerns the management of staff, as a key resource for the organization. The 
EEAS Review document tabled by HR/VP in July 2013 speaks of two separate and parallel structures, 
and concludes that “this dual system leads to multiple debate on the same issues, delays in decision-
making and can be an obstacle to direct contacts between the EEAS and Commission service with a 
stake in [EU] Delegations [to third countries]” (EEAS 2013: 11). 
In budgetary matters, EEAS administrative expenditures have to be planned “in consultation with the 
Commissioners for Development Policy and for European Neighbourhood Policy” (article 8, 
paragraph 3 of the EEAS Decision). In practice, the Commission is monitoring the EEAS procedures on 
a permanent basis, through the Foreign Policy Instruments service (FPI), a Commission department 
reporting directly to the HR/VP, but legally and administratively depending on the Commission. In 
principle, the Commission, as the sole body under the Treaties empowered to implement the Union 
budget, could at any time stop the disbursement of operational funds (with the exception of the 
European Development Fund and military components of CFSP expenses, both outside the Union 
budget). The EEAS is also accountable to and works in close cooperation with the Internal Audit 
Service (IAS) of the Commission (EEAS 2014). From article 3.4 of the EEAS Decision results a duty of 
cooperation with the internal auditor of the Commission as well as with the EU Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF). 
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Overall the provisions under Art.3.4 clearly point towards administrative accountability in the 
Bovens framework. In this category also the Commission’s responsibility for external operational 
budgets of the EU’s external action has to be mentioned: In financial terms, even though Art. 9 (6) of 
the EEAS Decision provides that actions taken under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
budget, certain actions under the instrument for Stability (IfS), the Instrument for Cooperation with 
Industrialised Countries (ICI), communication and public diplomacy as well as election monitoring will 
be the responsibility of the EEAS, the Commission remains responsible for the execution of the EU 
budget and for the management of programmes (in line with Art. 17 TEU). In order to respect the 
Commission’s prerogatives the Inter-Service Agreement dated 13 January 2012 confirms that 
important budgetary and implementation competences remain with the Commission, stating: “The 
EEAS shall refrain from taking measures […] on issues which fall under Commission competence.”7  
DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) underlines its competence and sole responsibility for 
operations and projects financed under Commission budget lines, co-programmed with the HR/VP 
(the Development Cooperation Instrument, and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument, ENPI) and the mechanisms programmed by the HR/VP, but managed by the Commission 
(the Instrument for Stability, IfS, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, and the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights8). To ensure its operational prerogatives, DEVCO, as 
has the Council Secretariat General by the way, has created a redundancy in keeping its own country 
desks at HQ for the central programme management, which serve as the connection with DEVCO 
personnel posted at EU Delegations as the ‘EU field offices’ with regard to administration and 
implementation of development and cooperation programmes.  
Commission DG DEVCO and ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy) have at least partly retained their 
control over the financing mechanisms, as ‘any proposals’ on the three existing development 
instruments need to be made jointly by the relevant departments of the EEAS and those of DG 
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DEVCO ‘under the responsibility of the Commissioner’ and ‘submitted jointly with the High 
Representative for adoption by the Commission’ (EEAS Decision 2010: Art. 9(4) and 9 (5)). 
 
4. The Courts of the Union  
With regard to the other two institutions, the role of the Court of Auditors deserves to be 
mentioned: The fact that the EEAS is an institution in the sense that it figures separately in the Union 
budget makes it also accountable to the Court of Auditors, and is included in the ECA’s annual report. 
In a number of examples the ECA is already exercising its full administrative and financial right of 
control over the EEAS. Less important, on the other side, is the relationship to the Court of Justice. In 
virtue of article 1 of the Council Decision the EEAS has been given “the legal capacities to perform its 
tasks and attain its objective”. Since the EEAS has not been set up under primary law and hence is 
not part of the institutions named under Art. 13 TEU, it remains to be seen whether the EEAS has the 
legal standing to be a party in proceedings before the Court (Van Vooren 2011, Blockmans and Hillion 
2012). In the case of lawsuit before the ECJ, where the institutional or substantive position of the 
EEAS is the subject of litigation, the service will probably be the object of proceedings between 
Parliament, Commission or Council.  
 
An accountable external action service? 
Which rules, whose rules? 
“Formal organizations temporarily settle issues about tasks, authority, power and accountability” 
(Olsen 2010: 37). Accordingly, bureaucrats’ identities and role perceptions may be an indicator of 
their ‘sense of belonging’ in terms of administrative rules and perceived accountability relations. 
Therefore, we asked which rules officials stick to when facing a situation that requires ethical 
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judgements or accountability-related evaluations: “When facing a conflict of interests or conflicting 
loyalties how much do you emphasize the guidelines provided by the following?” 
 
Table XX: Rules for accountability and loyalty (N=148) 
 (very) strongly 
(%) 
Somehow 
(%) 
Less strongly/ 
Not at all (%) 
Can’t say 
(%) 
Rules institution of origin 
(recruitment source) 
53.4 8.8 26.3 11.5 
Rules present affiliation 
(present employment) 
81.8 10.8 1.4 6.1 
Staff regulations EU 
institutions 
77.7 12.2 4.1 6.1 
Code of conduct for the 
civil service 
68.9 12.8 7.4 10.8 
Rules and standards for 
EU agencies 
20.3 11.5 33.1 35.1 
Supervisor/hierarchy 70.3 14.9 6.1 8.8 
National coordinator 8.8 4.1 48 39.2 
Other 1.4 0.7 2.0 85.8 
Table: Rules for conflicts of interests and loyalties (n=148) 
Original code list: ‘Very important’ (value 1), ‘important’ (value 2), ‘somewhat important’ (value 3), ‘less 
important’ (value 4), ‘not important’ (value 5), ‘can’t say’ (value 6). 
 
Most officials emphasize the “rules and regulations of [their] present affiliation” with 81.8% saying 
“strongly” or “very strongly”, followed by the “staff regulation for the personnel of European 
institutions” (78%) and “my supervisor/hierarchy” (70%). Less than 9 per cent answered that they at 
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least “strongly” emphasized guidelines by their national coordinator. More important seems to be 
the “Code of conduct for the civil service” (69%), which in the EU context is an abstract notion rather 
than a document directly applicable to staff of EU institutions.  
The fact that “rules and standards for EU agencies” (20%) score much lower could be taken as a  
statement that EEAS is not seen as an agency but rather close to a central level EU institution. 
Again, to see more specifically which officials chose different sets of rules or guidelines could give us 
a hint regarding their (converging or diverging) organizational identities and role perceptions. 
 
Accountability in practice  
Other than the presented de jure accountability relations it should be of interest to examine the de 
facto dynamics regarding the EEAS’ sensitivity for political concerns and signals. We present in the 
following some of the insights gained from the above mentioned EEAS survey study, conducted in 
2013. 
Presented with a choice of different political actors outside their own organization, officials pay most 
attention to central level EU institutions (European Commission – 74%, Foreign Affairs Council and 
European Council both 68 %, and finally the European Parliament – 58%. Only then follow “the big EU 
member states” – 51%, “the medium-sized EU member states” – 30%, International Organizations – 
23%, “the small MS” – 22%, and, finally, “signals from the domestic government of my own member 
state” – 17%.  
 
Table XX: Political signals (Total N=149) 
 (Very) important Somewhat Less/not Can’t say (%) 
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(%) important (%) important (%) 
European Council 67.8 14.8 5.3 12.1 
Foreign Affairs 
Council 
67.8 12.1 6.7 13.4 
European 
Commission 
73.8 10.7 6.7 8.7 
European 
Parliament 
57.7 19.5 11.4 11.4 
“Big” EU MS 51.1 18.1 19.4 11.4 
Medium-sized MS 30.2 34.9 22.8 12.1 
Small MS 22.1 35.6 30.9 11.4 
Own EU MS 17.4 14.1 57.7 10.7 
Political 
level/senior 
management  
83.9 4.7 3.3 8.1 
Direct hierarchy 87.9 5.4 1.4 5.4 
International 
organizations 
22.8 35.6 28.8 12.8 
Other 5.3 6.7 13.5 74.5 
Table: Political signals (n=149) 
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Original code list: ‘Very important’ (value 1), ‘important’ (value 2), ‘somewhat important’ (value 3), 
‘less important’ (value 4), ‘not important’ (value 5), ‘can’t say’ (value 6). 
Other than a clear emphasis put on signals from EU-level institutions, an interesting observation 
concerns the relative importance that is given to the EP, which corroborates the impression that the 
MEPs by smartly playing their hand throughout the negotiations which ultimately lead to the EEAS 
Decision have gained influence and political weight vis-à-vis other EU institutions, at least in the eyes 
of EEAS officials. However, this is an observation that is also shared by Commission officials, for 
instance in a quote, summarizing a trend detected by Ellinas and Suleiman (2012: 80): “For many 
years the EP was unimportant and it was ignored. It had the least standing among the institutions of 
the EU. It is undergoing a process of transition – gaining power and knowing how to use it.” 
 
Variation according to organizational affiliation 
As mentioned, the personnel of the EEAS are recruited from different institutional sources: the 
former DG RELEX, SGC, and the diplomatic services or the EU member states. By simple cross-
tabulation we analyse varying patterns of receptivity and attention paid to the signals and concerns 
of different accountability forums: 
Table XX: Political signals by PREVIOUS affiliation (source of recruitment) (Total n=130) 
 Intergovernmental (MS and SGC) staff (n=46) Supra-national (COMMISSION) staff (n=84) 
SINGALS 
(Very) 
important 
(%) 
Somewhat 
important 
(%) 
Less/not 
important % 
(Very) 
important 
(%) 
Somewhat 
important 
(%) 
Less/not 
important % 
European 
Council 
83 13 4 75 19 6 
Foreign 83 11 7 77 15 9 
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Affairs 
Council 
European 
Commission 
77 10 13 83 13 5 
European 
Parliament 
53 22 24 72 22 6 
‘Big’ MS 73 21 6 50 20 31 
‘Medium-
sized’ MS 
33 52 15 36 33 31 
‘Small’ MS 30 52 18 23 34 43 
Domestic 
Government 
19 25 55 20 11 69 
Political 
level/ senior 
management 
94 2 4 90 7 3 
Direct 
hierarchy 
94 2 4 90 7 3 
International 
Organization
s 
23 43 34 27 40 33 
Other 14  14 71 25 36 39 
Table: Political signals PREVIOUS affiliation (Total n=130) 
Original code list: ‘Very important’ (value 1), ‘important’ (value 2), ‘somewhat important’ (value 3), ‘less 
important’ (value 4), ‘not important’ (value 5), ‘can’t say’ (value 6). 
The highlighted (in bold) results above indicate a rather sharp difference when it comes to political 
orientation between the two staff-groups: former Commission staff is much more receptive towards 
signals from supra-national accountability forums, such as the European Commission and the 
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European Parliament, than their counterparts recruited from the member states. The latter are 
paying slightly more attention to European Council and the FAC and significantly more attention to 
signals from the big member states. Less surprisingly for hierarchically structured organizations, the 
officials’ sense of accountability is most strongly developed towards the political leadership/senior 
management and their own direct superiors. 
These patterns are even more pronounced comparing EU officials present affiliation, namely by 
employer. While those working directly for the EEAS (EEAS and MS’ seconded diplomats) are more 
intergovernmentally oriented, officials who are working in EU external relations but employed by the 
Commission (working either in EU Delegations in third countries or for the Commission services at 
the disposal at the HR/VP) are clearly more committed to their supranational overseers:  
Table XX: Political signals by PRESENT affiliation (employment relations) (Total n=142) 
 EEAS and MS staff (n=119) COMMISSION staff (n=23) 
SINGALS 
(Very) 
important 
(%) 
Somewhat 
important 
(%) 
Less/not 
important % 
(Very) 
important 
(%) 
Somewhat 
important 
(%) 
Less/not 
important % 
European 
Council 
79 18 3 63 16 21 
Foreign 
Affairs 
Council 
83 13 4 53 21 26 
European 
Commission 
78 15 7 95 0 5 
European 
Parliament 
74 25 10 70 25 15 
‘Big’ MS 59 22 19 47 11 42 
‘Medium- 34 45 21 32 21 47 
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sized’ MS 
‘Small’ MS 26 43 31 15 30 55 
Domestic 
Government 
19 19 61 15 0 85 
Political 
level/ senior 
management 
94 4 2 85 10 5 
Direct 
hierarchy 
95 4 1 91 9 0 
International 
Organization
s 
24 43 33 35 30 35 
Other 21  27 52 25 25 55 
Table: Political signals by PRESENT affiliation (Total n=142) 
Original code list: ‘Very important’ (value 1), ‘important’ (value 2), ‘somewhat important’ (value 3), ‘less 
important’ (value 4), ‘not important’ (value 5), ‘can’t say’ (value 6). 
 
Similar observations can be made for the type of concerns that are emphasized by the different 
groups of personnel. Although overall, the accountability orientation is directed towards the 
interests of the Union, some slight differences can be observed: 
 
Table XX: Concerns by organisational provenance (PREVIOUS affiliation, total n= 147) 
 
Intergovernmental (MS and SGC+ other) staff 
(n=52) 
COMMISSION staff (n=95) 
CONCERNS (Very) Somewhat Less/not (Very) Somewhat Less/not 
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important 
(%) 
important 
(%) 
important 
(%) 
important 
(%) 
important 
(%) 
important 
(%) 
 Political 
concerns 
88  4  8 78 18 4 
Interest of 
unit/division 
75 17 8 83 13 4 
Interest of 
DG/service 
73 17 10 84 13 3 
Interest of 
the EU 
90 4 6 95 4 1 
Interest of 
own MS 
25 14 61 5 9 86 
Table: Concerns and considerations by PREVIOUS affiliation (Total n=147) 
Original code list: ‘Very important’ (value 1), ‘important’ (value 2), ‘somewhat important’ (value 3), ‘less 
important’ (value 4), ‘not important’ (value 5), ‘can’t say’ (value 6). 
Former Commission personnel tends to be slightly more Community-minded and much less attuned 
(by 20%) to relations with the MS. In addition, the intergovernmental recruits are overall more 
politically oriented, and feel less strongly accountable to the supra-national organs, represented here 
by their service (the EEAS) or unit, or the ‘interest of the EU’ in general. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS have affected the 
accountability of EU foreign policy making in significant ways. First, it has put the EU’s external action 
high on the public agenda and increased its visibility. Whilst before, foreign and security policies 
were exclusively dealt with by the MS and the SGC, they are now accessible to other forums in the EU 
institutional landscape. In terms of democratic accountability, the rise of the EP as a major forum of 
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accountability is clearly the most striking development. As the only directly elected body, it 
represents the link to the EU citizens, exercises popular control over and thereby increases the 
legitimacy of EU foreign policy. Second, in a constitutional perspective, the EP fulfils important 
functions of checks and balances, avoiding concentration of power or the emergence of a 
autonomous run-away bureaucracy. The EP is thus directly overseeing the EEAS, but indirectly also 
extending its scrutiny to decision-making in the Council (with regard to EU foreign and security 
policy) as well as the European Commission (concerning all other aspects of external relations). 
Finally, the activities of the EP, notably motions and reports by its AFET committee, pushing for a 
more comprehensive approach to external action, but also for more efficiency and transparency, are 
also a crucial contribution with regard to the learning perspective of accountability. 
As we have seen, accountability relations come in different dimensions, i.e. political, financial, 
administrative, and legal, depending on what is to be investigated. In the case of the EEAS, different 
EU bodies fulfil those functions, and in the political and administrative dimensions certain overlaps 
and problems of multiple accountability have been detected. This also shows in the empirical data on 
officials’ accountability behaviour. Different staff groups, depending on their source of recruitment 
and present organizational affiliation tend to emphasize rules and signals by forums. This situation is 
aggravated by the presence of political rivalries between community institutions and Council as well 
as member states, which may result in a ‘problem of many eyes’ (Bovens et al. 2010: 41).  
Since, from a democratic perspective, the political accountability dimension is the most salient with 
regard to the EEAS, the EP’s involvement in the Unions external action proves to be the most novel 
and significant development in the EU’s post Lisbon foreign policy system. In terms of popular 
control, there is a certain improvement due to the European Parliament’s watchful eye on the EEAS, 
certainly in terms of transparency as compared to the somehow opaque situation before Lisbon. 
On the other hand new accountability relations produce some redundancies, complex and partly 
overlapping and sometimes conflicting accountability relations that may build up to a ‘multiple 
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accountability disorder’ or, in the worst case, lead to loss of control (Bovens et al. 2010). In this 
respect the new institutional cycle, after the elections to the EP in May 2014, may offer the 
opportunity to remedy existing shortcomings, eliminate redundancies and improve the overall 
functionality of the system of checks and balances holding the EEAS to account.  
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ANNEX I (Figure 1: ‘The EEAS in a web of accountability relations’) – please attached file 
 
ANNEX II – EEAS survey data 
In mid-2013, a survey study among EU officials (included seconded staff from national foreign 
ministries), involved in EU foreign policy making, gathered data on contact patterns, rules of loyalty 
and accountability, importance of political signals and professional concerns, conflicts and cleavages, 
and changes in the work situation of the personnel. Briefly presenting the dataset, used in the 
empirical analysis of the article, the 2013 EEAS survey provides the following information:  
Institutional affiliation and provenance 
With regard to their organizational provenance, most officials in our survey (74 persons, 41 %) were 
recruited (transferred) from DG RELEX, 19 respondents (11%) from the Council Secretariat General 
(SGC), and 24 respondents (13%) from MS Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The 24 seconded national 
diplomats in the survey come from 18 different member states. While most of the supranational 
personnel (Commission) came from DG RELEX, 21% of the respondents were working for other 
Commission DGs before 2011, i.e. Aid and Cooperation (AIDCO), Development (DEV), TRADE, and 
Enlargement (ELARG): 
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Table XX: Source of recruitment supranational (COM, EP) and 
intergovernmental sources (MS, SGC) 
 Previous affiliation (%) Present affiliation (%) 
EEAS - 75 
Council SG 10.6 - 
COM DG RELEX 41.1 -  
COM DEVCO -   12.5 
COM DG AIDCO 8.3  - 
COM DG ELARG 0.6 2.2 
COM DG TRADE 1.1 1.6 
COM DG DEV 12.2 - 
MS MFA 13.3 2.2 
EP 1.1 1.1 
Other 11.7 5.4 
N 180 184 
 
Table: Source of recruitment and present affiliation (total N=184) 
For our sample of 680 eligible respondents the response rate is thus close to 30 per cent. The data is 
reasonably representative with regard to officials’ previous affiliation, geographical balance (country 
of origin), place of assignment, educational background, as well as age and sex. With regard to 
nationality the survey could gather respondents from 23 different MS, with the ‘bigger’ MS overall 
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more strongly represented than the smaller ones. Also in terms of place of assignment the 
distribution of respondents is almost equally balanced between officials working at headquarter 
(52%) and EU-Delegations to third countries (47%). 
Distribution of respondents by hierarchical level 
Many seconded national diplomats have entered the service at the higher if not top hierarchical 
levels. However, as can be shown, both groups of survey respondents, intergovernmental recruits 
and supranational recruits are almost equally represented at the different hierarchical levels, with a 
intended overall survey bias for higher (management, diplomatic and political) levels of hierarchy.  
Table XX: Task/level by PREVIOUS affiliation (n=172) 
 Intergovernmental recruits (%) Supranational recruits 
(%) 
Political/diplomatic 58.3 51.8 
Managerial/administrative 36.7 45.5 
Technical/Operational  5 2.7 
N  60 (100%)  112 (100%) 
 
A second explanatory factor for differences within staff groups with regard to contact patterns and 
receptivity, concerns and conflicts could be linked to the place of assignment of officials. Indeed, we 
find a slight imbalance in the distribution of the two groups over the different workplaces: IG recruits 
among the survey respondents are slightly (by 10%) more likely to be employed at delegations. This 
however corresponds to the EEAS population, where the overall share of MS diplomats is 32.4% of 
AD level officials, whereas in Delegations diplomats amount to 45.4% of staff (EEAS 2014).  
Table XX: Place of Assignment by PREVIOUS affiliation (n=169) 
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 Intergovernmental recruits (%) Supranational recruits 
(%) 
Headquarters  61 49,1 
Delegations 39 50.1 
N 59 (100%) 110 (100%) 
 
 
 
                                                          
Notes 
 
1
 Text from the EEAS website: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/what_we_do/index_en.htm 
2
 Cf. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/what_we_do/index_en.htm  
However, the EEAS is also obliged to assist “…the President of the European Council and the President as well 
as the Members of the Commission in their respective functions in the area of external relations and ensures 
close cooperation with the Member States. The network of EU delegations around the world is part of the EEAS 
structure.” (ibid) 
3
 Cf. Article 1, Council Decision (2010).  
4
 Cf. Article 14 Council Decision (2010). “The High Representative will provide the European Parliament with all 
the necessary support for the exercise of the European Parliament’s right as discharge authority.” 
5
 Cf. Article 14 Council Decision (2010). «The implementation of the operational budget will be the 
Commission’s responsibility in accordance with Article 317 TFEU. Decisions having a financial impact will, in 
particular, comply with the responsibility of laid down in Title IV of the Financial Regulation, especially Articles 
64 to 68 thereof regarding liability of financial actors, and Article 75 thereof regarding expenditure operations.” 
6
 Cf. Article 14 Council Decision (2010). “In accordance with the applicable rules, and as  is the case for other 
institutions, a part of the annual report of the Court of Auditors will also be dedicated to the EEAS, and the 
EEAS will respond to such reports. The EEAS will be subject to the procedures regarding the discharge as 
provided for in Article 319 TFEU and in Articles 145 to 147 of the Financial Regulation.” 
7
 European Commission, Secretariat General (2011), Vademecum note on Working Relations with the European 
External Action Service. See also: Commission still pulls the strings on EU foreign policy, in:  EU Observer, 6 
February 2012, available at:  http://euobserver.com/18/115145; and ECDPM Talking-Points, Spotlight on 
division of labour between the EEAS and DG Devco, 3 February 2012, available at: http://www.ecdpm-
talkingpoints.org/division-of-labour-between-the-eeas-and-dg-devco/ . 
8
 A complete the list of cooperation mechanisms should also include the European Development Fund, EDF, for 
the group of ACP countries, based on the 2003 Cotonou agreement (intergovernmental instrument, funded 
directly by the MS, outside the EU budget). 
